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MODEL-BASED PRICING IN HURRICANE INSURANCE: A
CASE STUDY FOR JUDICIAL REFORM OF THE
MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
Benjamin Holland Able*

The McCarran-FergusonAct (MBA) exempts various aspects of state insurance
operationsfrom federal antitrust enforcement. This exemption is a source of longstanding controversy, due in part to its potentially harmful effect on consumers in
product pricing.In hurricane insurance, there is a burgeoning debate concerning
insurers' use of predictive computer models rather than shared loss data to set premiums for the industry. By using these models in hurricane-pronestates, insurers
have increased the price of hurricane insurance dramatically.
Where these new prediction methods are used, MFA exemption may facilitate
supracompetitivepricing in ways its architects could not have foreseen. This Note
analyzes MBA 's economic effects on model-basedpricing in hurricaneinsuranceto
argueforjudicialrevision of the Act. Through an effects test, it proposes conditioning eligibility for antitrust exemption on the economic benefits of a challenged
activity exceeding its costs.

INTRODUCTION

The McCarran-Ferguson Act's' (MFA) exemption of various as-

pects of state insurance operations from antitrust enforcement is a
source of long-standing controversy. This is due in part to the Act's

potentially harmful effect on consumers in key areas such as product pricing.2 Since the 1980s, there have been perennial legislative
efforts to repeal the Act or narrow its reach-all without success. 3
While scholars debate whether MFA should be revised or repealed

*
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guidance and feedback as well as Paul Caritj, William Chang, Nani Gilkerson, Pearl Pickett,
and Andrew Tonelli of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform for their valued
comments and editorial assistance. I also wish to give a special thanks to my parents, Adriane
and Barry, and sister, Holly, for their love and support.
1.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006).
2.
See, e.g., Francis Achampong, The McCarran-FergusonAct and the Limited InsuranceAntitrust Exemption: An Indefensible Aberration?, 15 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 141, 156 (1991).
3.
See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
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altogether to more closely align with modern legal and market conditions, 4 nearly all favor reform in some manner.5 Scholars note
that industry-specific exemption from antitrust law is generally disfavored and requires a compelling justification likely no longer
present in insurance. 6
MFA exemption has expanded as insurance markets and antitrust doctrine have evolved. Insurance, once a fledgling state-based
industry highly susceptible to panic and insolvency, has become a
stable and competitive international enterprise. 7 Antitrust laws,
once interpreted through rigid categories and bright lines, now involve flexible and sophisticated analyses of economic costs and
benefits. 8 Because new technologies and practices rapidly emerge
in the market and courts can more precisely determine their competitive costs, activities that would otherwise constitute antitrust
violations are increasingly immunized under MFA's ambit.
In hurricane insurance, there is an exceptionally high level of
uncertainty in pricing risk due to the extreme volatility and damage
associated with the erratic behavior of modern hurricanes.9 A burgeoning debate concerns insurers' use of complex prospective
computer models, rather than shared loss data, to set premiums for
the industry. 10 The methodologies of these models are divorced
from loss experience-based premium calculations and have increased prices dramatically in hurricane-prone states. Where these
new prediction methods are used, MFA exemption may facilitate
4.
See, e.g., Edward Correia, How to Reform the McCarran-FergsonAct 22 MEM. ST, U. L.
REv. 43, 89 (1991).
5.
Contra Achampong, supra note 2, at 169 (arguing existing doctrine should be
preserved).
6.
See Chris Sagers, Much Ado About Possibly Pretty Little: McCarran-FergusonRepeal in the
Health Care Reform Effort, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y Rxv. 325, 331-34 & 334 n.31 (2010).

7.
See Robert Klein, Regulation and CatastropheInsurance, in PAYING -IE PmUca: Tm STATUS AND RoLE oF INSURANCE AGAJNST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNrrED STATES 171, 173
(Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth, Sr. eds., 1998).
8.
Susan Beth Farmer, Competition and Regulation in the Insurance Sector: Reassessing the
McCartan-FergusonAct, 89 O. L. Rv. 915, 925 (2011).
9.
Patricia Grossi & Howard Kunreuther, Introduction: Needs, Stakeholders, and Government Initiatives, in CATAsTROPHE MODELING: A NEw APPROACH TO MANAGING RISK 3, 3-4, 9

(2005).
10. Critics include J. Robert Hunter, former Texas Insurance Commissioner and Federal Insurance Administrator for U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and
Karen M. Clark, who developed the first catastrophe model and founded the first modeling
company. See The McCarran-FergusonAct: Implications of Repealing the Insurers' Antitrust Exemption: Hearings Before the Sen. Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 88 (2007) (statement of J.
Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, Consumer Federation of America); Karen M. Clark,
The Use of Computer Modeling in Estimating and ManagingFuture CatastropheLosses, 27 GENEVA
PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 181, 189 (2002).
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supracompetitive pricing in ways its architects could not have foreseen. As such, hurricane insurance offers fertile ground for
discussions about how the MFA can be revised to improve economic outcomes for consumers and society.
This Note argues for judicial revision of the MFA through a case
study of the Act's economic effects on model-based pricing in the
hurricane insurance market. Part I provides an overview of current
regulation of rate-setting activities by insurers. Part II conducts a
cost-benefit analysis of MFA exemption on model-based pricing in
the hurricane insurance market. Weighing these considerations,
Part III proposes incorporating an effects test into judicial interpretation of MFA that would condition eligibility for exemption on
economic benefits exceeding costs. Part IV discusses repercussions
and criticisms of this proposal and alternatives.

I. EXISTING REGULATION OF INSURER PRICE-SETING AcTvrrY
This Part discusses the existing regulation of price setting by insurers. Because MFA protects insurer price setting from antitrust
enforcement, analysis will focus on the Act itself rather than the
antitrust laws whose applicability it bars. This Part also analyzes existing price regulation by state insurance departments and
hurricane-specific regulatory developments.

A. Antitrust Exemption: History and Legislative Development
This Section discusses MFA's legislative history, text, and the judicial interpretation of its provisions as applied to price setting. In
1869, the Supreme Court held that insurance transactions were not
interstate commerce. 1 The power to regulate and tax insurers was
thus left exclusively to the states. In 1944, however, the Court reversed its position and, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association,12 held that Congress did have the authority to regulate
insurance.1 3 This holding sent shockwaves through the industry and

11.
12.
13.

Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868).
322 U.S. 533 (1944).
Id. at 553.
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alarmed legislators and regulators. 14 Congress was particularly concerned that existing state taxes and regulations might be
unconstitutional or, worse, vulnerable to federal takeover.' 5
Congressional fears about the impact of the decision were combined with concerns of destructive price competition in insurance.
Those concerns dated back to the crisis in the fire insurance industry during the late nineteenth century, when large fires and rate
wars among rival insurers led to "crippling losses" and widespread
insolvency.' 6 The ultimate architects and proponents of MFA
viewed joint rate making as an antidote to destructive price competition.' 7 Antitrust enforcement to promote price competition was,
by contrast, viewed as exacerbating the problem.',
Congress's first response to South-Eastern Underwriters was conceived within three weeks of the opinion: that proposal created an
unqualified antitrust exemption for the "business of insurance," but
failed to generate sufficient support. 19 The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) next put forth a proposal that
focused less on antitrust exemption than on cementing state regulatory authority over insurance. 20 The NAIC proposal, which limited
exemption to a list of enumerated activities, was "seen as 'an entirely new bill' 2' and represented "compromise among all
22
interested parties."
On December 19, 1944, Senators McCarran and Ferguson introduced an amended version of the NAIC bill providing that federal
antitrust laws would preempt state insurance laws in cases of conflict.23 The House rejected this amendment, asserting that state laws

should prevail. 24 Conferees added a proviso, section 2 (b), reflecting
a compromise between the two versions.2 5 The amended bill was
14.
"The entire operation of the insurance business is now in more or less a chaotic
condition. . . ." 91 CONG. REc. 1488 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Radcliffe). House and Senate
Reports mention the necessity of federal legislation to "stabilize the general situation." H.R.
REP. No. 79-68, at 2 (1945); S.R. RPP. No. 79-20, at 2 (1945).
15. Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-FergusonAct's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DuKE L.J. 587, 590-92.
16. Laurence M. Hamric, Note, The McCarran-FergusonAct: A Time for Procompetitive Reform, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1271, 1273-74 (1976).
17. As cosponsor Senator Ferguson noted, "This bill would permit ...rating bureaus[ ]
because . . . we cannot have open competition in fixing rates ....

(1945).
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

" 91 CONG. REc. 1481

See Sagers, supra note 6, at 331-33.
Weller, supra note 15, at 592 & n.34.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 595.
Id.
91 CONG. REc. 330 (1945).

Weller, supra note 15, at 596-97 & nn.53-54, 603 & nn.82-83.
Id. at 597.
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passed by the Senate and House on March 9, 1945, and provides, in
pertinent part:
Section 2(b). No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That
after June 30, 1948, the... [antitrust laws] shall be applicable to
the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regu26
lated by State law.
Through section 2(b)'s proviso, MFA creates a partial exemption
from federal antitrust laws for insurers if their activity falls within
the scope of the "business of insurance" and only "to the extent"
that the activity "is not regulated by State law."'27 The Act provides
that state insurance regulations preempt non-insurance federal laws
that would "invalidate, impair, or supersede" them. 28 Whether the
"supersede" clause qualifies or operates independently of the proviso exempting insurance activity from antitrust enforcement,
however, is textually ambiguous given the proviso's placement after
29
the clause.
In 1979, the Supreme Court held in Group Life & Health Insurance
Co. v. Royal Drug Co. that "the fixing of rates is the 'business of insurance.' ' 3 0

Federal Courts of Appeals and District Courts have

adopted this bright-line rule.-t In its ruling, the Supreme Court emphasized Congress's intent, in enacting MFA, to preserve joint price

26.

15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006) (emphasis added).

27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29. Weller, supra note 15, at 604-05 (arguing that the "supersede" clause is not an exceptions clause under traditional canons of interpretation).
30.
440 U.S. 205, 224 n.32 (1979).
31.
See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 355 (3d Cir. 2010); In re
Title Ins. Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 868 (N.D. Ohio 2010). The Eleventh Circuit
has held rate making to be "paradigmatic" of the activities Congress contemplated protecting. Gilchrist v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 390 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing Royal Drug).
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setting by competing insurers.,3 2 This reflects the Court's and Congress's view that insurers sharing loss information was necessary to
33
prevent widespread insolvency in the industry.

B. Judicial Interpretation of "To the extent ... not regulated
by State law"
There are two dominant views regarding the extent of regulation
required to trigger antitrust exemption under MFA: the "general
authorization" view, which defines "regulated by State law" as anything generally authorized by the state, and the "effective
regulation" view, which requires active oversight of insurance operations by the state, rather than simply its statutory possibility. 3 4 The
latter is articulated in Judge Godbold's dissent in Crawford v. American Title Insurance Co.,35 where he argued that antitrust laws should
36
be enforceable absent state enactment of "'adequate' regulation."
The Act's legislative history supports requiring such a minimal level
of state regulation to justify antitrust exemption.37 Anthony Alt, citing this history, argues that "Congressional intent . . . was that
federal antitrust laws would apply where states were not adequately
38
regulating an activity."
In general, however, federal court decisions at all levels support
the "general authorization" interpretation and find activities to be
sufficiently "regulated" for the purposes of MFA through "superficial indicators of supervision" and without regard to the intensity or
extent of state regulation. 39 Minimal regulation, even on an issue
32. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. at 223 (citing 91 CONG. REG. 1444, 1485 (1945) (remarks of
Sen. O'Mahoney)) (noting Congress's "concern that cooperative ratemaking would be protected from the antitrust laws").
33. See Sagers, supra note 6, at 334-35 & 334 n.39; Earl W. Kintner et al., Application of the
Antitrust Laws to the Activities of Insurance Companies: Heavier Risks, Expanded Coverage, and
Greater Liability, 63 N.C. L. REv. 431, 434-35 (1985).
34.
Timothy H. Hiebert, The State Regulation Requirement Under Section 2(b) of the McCarran-FergusonAct, 53 INS. COUNSEL J. 234, 239-40 (1986).
35.
518 F.2d 217 (1975).
36. Id. at 222 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
37. Senator Barkley inquires "whether, where States attempt to occupy the field-but do
it inadequately- .. , it is the Senator's interpretation ... [that] these acts still would apply?"
McCarran responds, "That is my interpretation." 91 CONG. REc. 1444 (1945) (remarks of Sen.
Barkley).
38.
Anthony J. Alt, Congress' Self-Inflicted Sisyphean Task: The Insurance Industy's Federal
Antitrust Exemption and the Insurance Industiy Competition Acts of 2007 and 2009, 16 CONN. INS.
L.J. 399, 424 (2010).
39. IA PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 219c, at 25 (3d ed.
2006).
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unrelated to the suit, is sufficient to confer exemption. 40 Although
petitioners have repeatedly argued that "regulation" implies a minimal level of effectiveness or enforcement, 4 1 the Supreme Court has
rejected this argument. Instead, the Court has interpreted "regulated by State law" to require no more than the establishment of
generalized codes of conduct. In Federal Trade Commission v. National Casualty Co.,42 the Court rejected FTC arguments that "a
general prohibition.. . is too 'inchoate' to be 'regulation' " compared to regulations "crystallized into an 'administrative
elaboration of... standards.' "43 The Court's ruling that "nothing
in the language of that Act or its legislative history supports [that]
distinction[ ]"still stands.4 4
Subsequent case law has accordingly required very little of state
regulation to preclude antitrust applicability under MFA. The District Court in California League of Independent Insurance Producers v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 45 ruled that California's antitrust statute
and insurance code were sufficient to confer exemption, 46 claiming
that "regulated" is satisfied "if a State has generally authorized or permitted certain standards of conduct."47 The Sixth Circuit used the
same standard48 in finding that an Ohio rate review statute conferred exemption despite its nonenforcement. 49 The Eighth Circuit
held that satisfaction of "regulated by State law" in section 2(b)
"does not depend on the zeal and efficiency" of enforcement, but
50
on whether the regulation is "capable of being enforced."
Existing precedent, however, does not foreclose an interpretation of "regulated by State law" under MFA that would require
more active state oversight to find federal antitrust enforcement
precluded. Scholars label National Casualty an "offhanded treatment" of section 2(b),51 and some attribute the decision to
misleading evidence presented by Federal Trade Commission attorneys litigating the case.52 William Rands, in contrast, believes
40.
Id.
41.
Kintner et al., supra note 33, at 476.
357 U.S. 560 (1958).
42.
Id. at 563.
43.
44. Id. But see Escrow Disbursement Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Am. Title & Ins. Co., Inc., 550 F.
Supp. 1192, 1199 (S.D. Fla. 1982) ("[It is essential to conduct some sort of inquiry into the
adequacy and effectiveness of state legislation asserted to preempt the antitrust laws.").
45.
175 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
46.
Id. at 860.
Id. (emphasis added).
47.
48.
Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ins. Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir. 1971).
49.
Id. at 1184.
50.
Lawyers Tide Co. v. St. Paul Title Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1975).
See, e.g., Hamric, supranote 16, at 1284.
51.
See Hiebert, supra note 34, at 241-42.
52.
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objections to National Casualty are the product of policy disagree53
ments rather than strict constructionist interpretations of the Act.
In any event, according to Professor Keeton, while current decisions do not do so, "[c]ertainly it is open to the Supreme Court
to . . . consider" the "practical effectiveness" of state regulations in
determining whether they are sufficient to confer exemption under
54
the MFA.

C. Insurance Regulation
This section provides an overview of state regulation of insurance. It begins with a history of the development of rating bureaus
and rate regulation. It then discusses current models of rate regulation and the special challenges that hurricane insurance raises.

1. History of Rate Regulation
Self-regulation of rates by insurers began in response to the "rate
wars" of the nineteenth century and the resulting insolvencies. 55 In
1806, insurers began to informally agree on rates and, in 1819, coalesced into local boards that fixed prices.5 6 States responded by
57
enacting "anti-compact" laws that prohibited joint price setting.
Boards evaded these laws by promulgating "advisory rates" that insurers could voluntarily adopt, 5 prompting states to exert greater
control over price setting.
In 1909, Kansas became the first state to adopt a rate regulation
statute, which set a model for subsequent statutes. 59 Kansas's statute
authorized the state's insurance commissioner to review rates and
ensure that they were not "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory." 6 In the following decades, all but three states
adopted rate regulation in some form. 61 After Congress enacted
MFA, state insurance commissioners lobbied state legislatures for
53.
See William J. Rands, Comment, State Regulation Under the McCarranAct, 47 TuL. L.
REv. 1069, 1073 (1973).
54.
See Welter, supranote 15, at 606 n.96 (citing ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW 541
(1971) (footnote omitted)).
55.
Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-FergsonAct in HistoricalPerspective, 56 MICH. L. REv. 545, 551 (1958).
56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 549.
58.
Id.
59.
Id. at 551, 557.
60.
Id. at 556.
61.
Id. at 551.
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"All-Industry" bills which uniformly regulated rate setting for all
types of insurance; such bills were adopted in virtually every state
with little variation.6 2 These regulations mandate that rates be "ascertained on the basis of statistical experience" and filed with the
state insurance department. 63 Under the model statutes, the insurfound to
ance commissioner retains the power to disapprove rates
64
be "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory."

2. Current Models of Rate Regulation
and Their Effects in the Market
The expansion of the insurance market to cover more risks, rely
on a wider array of financing tools, and coordinate and extend beyond state boundaries has complicated rate regulation considerably
since the enactment of the 1909 statute. Professor Klein attributes
the development of modern insurance rate regulation to: (1) the
"dramatic growth and increasing diversity of insurance products
and the types of risks that insurers have assumed," (2) the "increased competition among insurers and alternative risk-financing
mechanisms," (3) the demand pressures of the 1980s that resulted
in "a significant increase in insurer failures and guaranty funds
costs," and (4) "the geographic extension of insurance markets nationally and internationally, which has increased the
interdependence among regulatory jurisdictions."' 65 These rapid
market developments have exerted considerable pressure on state
insurance regulators attempting to keep pace with increasingly sophisticated and opaque pricing practices.
Current state regulation of insurance prices generally requires
that rates be "reasonable" and not "excessive" or "unfair" according
to prevailing actuarial standards. 66 This affords state insurance commissioners inherent discretion in approving or disapproving rates.
Actuarial-licensing and state rate-filing requirements necessitate
that insurance prices submitted to commissioners be justified based
62.
Id. at 555.
63.
Id. at 556.
64.
Id.
65.
Klein, supra note 7, at 173.
KENNETH S. ABRAHAm, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 142-43 (5th ed. 2010); Den66.
nis Kuzak & Tom Larsen, Use of CatastropheModels in Insurance Rate Making, in CATASTROPHE
MODELING: A NEW APPROACH TO MANAGING RISK 97, 110 (Patricia Grossi & Howard
Kunreuther eds., 2005) (explaining that actuarial SOP require rates not to be excessive, unreasonable, or unfairly discriminatory). See generally Sharon Tennyson, Efficiency Consequences
of Rate Regulation in Insurance Markets 2 (Networks Fin. Inst. at Ind. State Univ., Working
Paper No. 2007-PB-03, 2007) (outlining history of rate regulation in the United States).
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Some states offer

a judicial avenue for insurers and private citizens to challenge the
rates approved by insurance departments through a public hearing
before an administrative law judge. 68
The majority of modem rate regulation comes in the form of
"prior approval" or "file and use" regulations. "Prior approval" regulations require insurers to submit rate proposals to the
department of insurance, which must approve them before the
rates can be adopted. 69 "File and use" regulations, by contrast, allow
rate increases to become effective immediately upon filing with the
state, though they may be later disapproved. 70
The regulatory process of setting "adequate" floors and "excessive" ceilings for rates, common to both "prior approval" and "file
and use" jurisdictions, has its disadvantages. Commissioners must
assess market conditions and determine appropriate rate maxima
and minima with imperfect or nonexistent information. 71 Identifying errors or mistakes is difficult because data on claims affecting
the premium are unavailable until the subsequent year. 72 Additionally, insurance departments are often inadequately staffed to
perform their regulatory functions73 and face significant resource
demands, limited economies of scale, high costs for information
and databases, as well as administrative duplication.7 4
"Adequate" and "excessive" standards75 also distort efficiencymaximizing decisions that would otherwise be made by insurers and
consumers. 76 For instance, rate ceilings suppress average premiums

67.
ACTUArIu STANDARDS BD., TREATMENT OF CATASTROPHE LOSSES IN PROPERTY/CAsUALTY INSURANCE RATEMAKING, AcruAmAL STANDARD OF PRACTICE No. 39 2-4 (2000), available

at http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/pdf/asops/asop039-072.pdf;

STATE

OF CAL.

DEP'T OF INS., FiNAL RFGuLATION TEXT, RH05042749 6 (2007), available at http://www20.

insurance.ca.gov/pdf/REG/92629.pdf (noting requirement that data on costs be reviewed
and submitted to support rate request).
68.
Kuzak & Larsen, supra note 66, at 109.
69.
See ABRAHAM, supra note 66, at 137. If the department fails to disapprove a rate
within the statutory period (usually ninety days or less), the filed rate becomes effective. This
system is disfavored by economists because of the uncertainty and lag time imposed on insurers. See Tennyson, supra note 66, at 13 & n.12.
70.
Id.
71.
See Klein, supra note 7, at 182.
72.
See AaRAHAM, supra note 66, at 137.
73.

See Klein, supra note 7, at 183.
74.
See id. at 182-83.
75.
There is inherent discretion in a state insurance department's decision to approve
or disapprove rates. See ABRAHAM, supra note 66, at 142-43.
76.
See Tennyson, supra note 66, at 12-20.
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below competitive levels, 77 "potentially threaten[ing] insurers' solvency if exit is restricted."78 Low insurance prices may also create
incentives for consumers to engage in high-risk behaviors through
moral hazard (such as locating property in hurricane-prone areas)
or not take reasonable precautions (such as failing to retrofit
homes) . 9 This can ultimately "produce upward pressure on . . .
80
losses" and "lead to higher insurance premiums."
A benefit of state rate regulation is that it internalizes a substantial transaction cost-measuring the risk of insolvency-that
consumers would otherwise bear.8 ' Experts note that "it is both
costly and arduous to 'assess an insurer's financial strength in relation to its prices and quality of service.'" 82 Assessment requires
intricate mathematical calculations based on "complex and privileged information." 83 Without a regulatory agency to determine
whether an insurer's price is sufficient to cover insolvency risk, consumers would be poorly situated to make this assessment on their
own.

3. Hurricane Insurance Regulation
The limitations of traditional methods of pricing hurricane risks
have created opportunities for new pricing behaviors that may
harm consumers. Rating bureaus and actuarial methods underestimate risk because sample size is too small and available data do not
84
correlate with the size of future hurricanes or resulting damage.
Accordingly, the industry has shifted from past claims analysis to
prospective computer models to set prices.8 5 Loss costs generated
Id. at 12.
78.
Klein, supra note 7, at 197.
79.
Tennyson, supra note 66, at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
80.
81.
For a discussion of the transaction cost analysis, see Sean Leibowitz, Comment, State
InsuranceRate Regulation: A Coasian Perspective, 17 J.L. Bus. & ETHICS 107, 114-15 (2011).
82.
Id. at 115 (internal citation omitted).
83.
Id.
84.
Mehrdad Mahdyiar & Beverly Porter, The Risk Assessment Process: The Role of Catastrophe Modeling in Dealing with Natural Hazards,in CATASTROPHE MODELING: A NEW APPROACH TO
MANAGING RISK 45, 45 (Patricia Grossi & Howard Kunreuther eds., 2005); Paul R. Kleindorfer
& Robert W. Klein, Regulation and Markets for Catastrophe Insurance, inADVANCES INECONOMIC
DESIGN 263, 275 (Murat R. Sertel & Semih Koray, eds., 2003); Sarah M. Tran, Updated Huricane Models: A New Opportunity to Insure Against Climate Change, 14 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 73, 86
(2008); Charles C. Watson,Jr. et al., InsuranceRate Filings and HurricaneLoss EstimationModels,
77.

22 J. INS. REG. 39, 39-40, 58 (2004).
85.

See Tran, supra note 84, at 90-91.
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by models are added directly into the premium calculation,8 6 along
87
with expense and risk loading.
Models consist of computer codes and programs that simulate
future natural disasters. 88 For given input parameters, a model produces the most likely pattern of natural disasters and calculates the
resulting damage to property in a given area.89 For an insurer, the
final amount a model generates reflects the total loss costs for the
insured property.9 0 The models, however, are proprietary, exclusively owned by the modelers that produce them for insurers: how
exactly a specific model works, therefore, is not public
information. 91
In hurricane insurance, models present "difficulty [for regulators] assessing the validity of the new catastrophe rate analyses and
the assumptions that drive their results."9 2 Accepting the higher
rates produced by computer models remains controversial and politically charged.9 3 In a 2006 Massachusetts case, for instance, the
state's Attorney General sued the state's Insurance Commissioner
94
for approving a model-based rate increase.
Florida has led the way in regulating computer model pricing by
establishing its own "public" hurricane model to which it can compare private model estimates and approve or disapprove rates
accordingly.9 5 This template has informed regulation in other states
that are confronting the challenge of pricing hurricane risks. 96 For
example, Louisiana's rate review procedure uses the results of Florida's model to determine whether model-based premium increases
should be approved.9 7 After Florida's model was established, nine
states enacted rate regulation specific to hurricane insurance. 98
There is debate among states as to whether imposing "file and use"
86. Kuzak & Larsen, supra note 66, at 100.
87.
These refer to amounts added to the premium to cover the insurer's administrative
expenses (expense loading) and to account for the risk of catastrophic loss (risk loading).
88.
Mahdyiar & Porter, supra note 84, at 46.
89.
Patricia Grossi et al., An Introductionto CatastropheModels and Insurance,in CATASTROPHE MODELING: A NEw APPROACH TO MANAGING RISK 23, 26-27 (Patricia Grossi & Howard
Kunreuther eds., 2005).
90.
Kuzak & Larsen, supra note 66, at 98.
91.
Id. at 106-07.
92.
Klein, supra note 7, at 197.
93.
Id. at 197-98.
94.
See Tran, supra note 84, at 91-100. In Florida, the insurance commissioner challenged a model estimate approved by the State's "public model." Klein, supra note 7, at 198.
95.
SeeJohn Rollins, The Evolving Regulatoiy Profile of CatastropheModels: Part 2, AiR CUR.
REN-rs NEWSLETTER, Apr. 2008, at 2.
96, Id.
97. Id. The commissioner for Louisiana determined, however, that long-term average
ocean temperature data should not be incorporated into rate increase decisions. Id.
98. Klein, supra note 7, at 197-98.
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or "prior approval" regulations is preferable in the absence of a
Florida-style model.9 9 In any case, existing regulations create a great
deal of uncertainty, lack of uniformity, and inefficiency in the process of evaluating and approving insurers' rates.

II.

EFFECTS OF

MFA

EXEMPTION FOR MODEL-BASED PRICING

IN THE MARKET FOR HURRICANE INSURANCE

In hurricane insurance, widespread adoption of the latest computer modeling technology in predicting future losses has allowed
insurers to increase prices for consumers. 0 0 Because MFA exempts
all price-setting activities from federal antitrust enforcement, 0 1
there is no mechanism to protect consumers from the negative consequences (higher prices and under-insurance, for example) if a
pricing practice restricts competition in the market. Were antitrust
enforcement permitted, regulators and courts would analyze
whether the negative effects of model-based pricing outweigh the
positive effects. If costs exceeded benefits, the activity could be prohibited in its current form under antitrust law and the industry
would adopt a new model. This Part analyzes the competitive costs
and benefits of model-based pricing to, in turn, determine the costs
and benefits of MFA's antitrust exemption in the hurricane insurance market.

A. HurricaneAndrew and the Development of Model-Based Pricing
The unprecedented amount of insured loss resulting from Hurricane Andrew represented a departure from the predictability of
previous disasters. In 1992, there were roughly $15.5 billion in insured losses in Florida due to Hurricane Andrew alone. 10 2 The
storm caused forty deaths, left more than 250,000 people homeless,
destroyed or damaged 82,000 businesses, and led to the exodus of
more than 100,000 people from Dade County, Florida. 10 3 The premiums charged by insurers, determined using bureau calculations,
99.
100.

Id.. See also Rollins, supra note 95, at 2.
See, e.g., J. ROBERT HUNTER, PROPERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE IN 2007: OVERPRICFD INSURANCE, UNDERPAID CLAIMS, DECLINING LOSSES AND UNJUSTIFIED PROFITS 10 (2007).
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006).
102. The Impact of Catastropheson Property Insurance,INs. SERVS. OFFICE (Jan. 1994), http://
www.iso.com/Research-and-Analyses/Studies-and-Whitepapers/The-lmpact-of-Catastropheson-Property-lnsurance.html.
103. HurricaneAndrew, After the Storm: Ten Years Later, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, http://WWW.
sptimes.com/2OO2/webspecialsO2/andrew/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
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totaled $80 million. 104 At this rate, insurers would have needed well
over one hundred years of premium payments to compensate for
losses due to Hurricane Andrew alone. 05 As a result, twelve hurricane insurers in Florida became insolvent, leaving consumers
without coverage. 10 6 Experts note that the bureau's "rate setting
process grossly understated the actual risk, shocking the insurance
and reinsurance industry with losses far greater than they ever
imagined."' 0 7 The loss costs to insurers were ultimately transferred
to consumers and the state in the form of unpaid claims and reliance on guaranty funds.0 8
In response to Hurricane Andrew, modelers in the 1990s began
to construct the first computer models to price insurance based on
theoretical, long-term average weather conditions.1 09 Improvements
with this prediction technology enabled the top ten hurricane insurers to earn $59.9 billion in profits in 2006110 despite liability for
$45 billion in claims from Hurricane Katrina."'
Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, a major modeler released a new
12
generation of forward-looking models that was physically-based.'
Compared to pre-Katrina models, physically-based models purport
to more accurately predict future losses because output is not based
on weather patterns or historical data. Instead, physically-based
models consider the physics behind hurricanes, the inherent uncertainty of hurricanes themselves, theoretical outcomes from
probability distributions,"1 and exogenous changes (for example,
climate change, El Nifio cycles) that influence how hurricanes
grow, develop, and inflict damage. 1 4 Implementing physicallybased models has resulted in a 40 percent increase in premiums
104, Patricia Grossi & Don Windeler, Sources, Nature, and Impact of Uncertaintieson Catastrophe Modeling, in CATASTROPHE MODELING: A NEw APPROACH TO MANAGING RIsK 69, 79-80

(Patricia Grossi & Howard Kunreuther eds., 2005).
105. Id. at 79-80.
106. Kleindorfer & Klein, supra note 84, at 13.
107. Grossi & Windeler, supra note 104, at 80.
108. See Grossi & Kunreuther, supra note 9, at 9, 18.
109. See Tran, supra note 84, at 85-87.
110. HUNTER, supra note 100, at 19 (Addendum B: Profits, Losses, Surplus for Top 10
Property/Casualty Insurers).
111. Tran, supra note 84, at 88.
112. This model was released in June 2006 by Risk Management Solutions. For a general
description of physically based models, see Clark, supra note 10, at 189.
113. Mahdyiar & Porter, supra note 84, at 47.
114. For a description of the uncertainties and risks associated with models, see generally
Tran, supra note 84, at 90 ("The model takes into account... [how] climate change [has]
markedly heated oceanic temperatures.. . ."). See also Grossi & Windeler, supra note 104, at
70-74; Kleindorfer & Klein, supra note 84, at 13.
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across the Gulf Coast and Florida. 115 Some Florida businesses received tenfold rate increases in 2006 following the introduction of
the new models.11 6 A number of experts have suggested that insurers and rating bureaus are encouraging modelers to design models
that increase cost estimates so as to boost industry profits irrespec17
tive of their accuracy.

B. Criticisms of Physically Based Modeling
Insurers cannot explicitly set prices based on collusive industry
agreement without supporting cost evidence. To collude without
violating rate-filing and actuarial-licensure requirements, insurers
would need a third party to generate consistently high loss cost estimates that all insurers could use to set prices. In hurricane
insurance, modelers are allowed to act as these third parties." 8 Absent antitrust enforcement, a modeler has every incentive to
generate the highest loss costs possible for its clients so long as it
can muster sufficient scientific evidence to pacify regulators. Modelers' unexamined-and, in many instances, unregulated' 9-models
project loss cost estimates that insurers across the industry can use
to set supracompetitive prices. This is possible because the model
itself communicates its ability to produce a higher loss cost estimate
than is otherwise available through the use of historic data. The
model also guarantees that competing insurers may receive a comparable estimate by employing the same model.
There is considerable disagreement among actuaries regarding
the accuracy of physically-based models.120 Karen Clark, who invented the first model, suggests that insurers are overly reliant on
these models, 1 1 noting that they instill a "false sense of security by
all the scientific jargon," when "in reality.., the science underlying
115. See HUNTER, supra note 100, at 10; Tran, supra note 84, at 91.
116. HUNTER, supra note 100, at 10.
117. This includesJ. Robert Hunter and Karen M. Clark. See supra note 10.
118. See The McCarran-FergusonAct: Implications of Repealing the Insurers'AntitrustExemption:
Hearings Before the Sen. Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 88 (2007) (statement ofJ. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, Consumer Federation of America) ("Insurers often try to
position supposedly objective and independent third parties as public decision-makers when
it is insurers themselves who want to increase rates ...
119. Id.
120. For a discussion of the distinction between early probabilistic and current physicallybased models, see generally Clark, supra note 10, at 189.
121. See, e.g., Andrew G. Simpson, P/C Industry Depends Too Much on CatastropheModels,
Says Pioneer Clark, INS. J. (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/
2011/04/14/194464.hin.
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the models is highly uncertain." 22 She recommends that insurers
incorporate models as tools rather than determinative price-setters:
"[Insurers] need to be skeptical of the numbers . .

. And they

should not even use [them]" if costs increase by 100 percent or
more, as with hurricane insurance. 23 Critics also point to the way
models use unverifiable scientific assumptions to calculate losses
and resulting price increases disproportionate to any conceivable
pattern of hurricane damage. 12 4 Rather than stabilized pricing resulting from models' ability to more accurately account for ebbs
and flows in hurricane activity, model-based pricing reflects constant increases unlikely to correspond to actual hurricane
behavior.

2 5

C. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Model-Based Pricing
This section analyzes the costs and benefits of model-based pricing in hurricane insurance to determine the respective costs and
benefits of antitrust exemption for this activity.

1. Costs of Model-Based Pricing
In the hurricane insurance market, demand constraints require
that prices reflect the insured's estimate of expected loss such that
buying insurance will maximize total expected utility relative to
other options (for example, mitigation, relocation, self-insurance).126 Supply constraints require that premiums be sufficiently
high for investors to expect a favorable return on capital invested
"given the risk characteristics of the insurer." 2 7 Prices must be high
enough, through risk loading, 128 to account for the risk of a worst122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See HUNTER, supra note 100, at 9-11.
125. Id. The Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology found significant variation in loss costs for thirteen models submitted for review. FLA. COMM'N ON
HuRRucANE Loss PROJECTION METHODOLOGY, REPORT TO THE FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATivEs COMAuSON OF HURMCANE Loss PROJECTION MODELS (2007). Researchers Watson and
Johnson observed differences in loss costs of "nearly a factor of six." See generally Charles C.
Watson, Jr. & Mark E.Johnson, Hurricane Loss Estimation Models: Opportunitiesfor Improving the
State of the Art, 85 BULLETIN OF AM. METEOROLOGICAL Soc'v 1713, 1722 (2004).
126. Kuzak & Larsen, supra note 66, at 97.
127. Id.
128. See supra note 87.
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case hurricane and maintain the insurer's solvency and credit
rating. 129
In a competitive market, insurers never know if a competitor's
rates differ from their own because of that competitor's inaccurate
cost estimates or because of its desire to drive rivals out of business.
This lack of information creates incentives for insurers to price as
close as possible to the competitive equilibrium in order to avoid
being out-priced by competitors, maximizing social efficiency. Models provide a reliable mechanism for projecting higher costs, which
enable insurers to justify requests for higher rate increases. Insurers
know that competitors using a given model will price similarly and
that everyone's profits will increase.
In a model-based exempted market, insurers will flock to models
generating the highest loss costs. This market signal not only encourages inflated pricing by insurers using the model, but also
eliminates insurers' incentive to price more accurately. An insurer
combining models with loss experience-based calculations (for example, trend or loss development) to reach more accurate prices
would increase the chances of underpricing and forego the profits
available with high-cost models.
If antitrust enforcement removed the informational shortcuts of
models, namely the need to determine a competitive rate, insurers
would develop their own technologies and methods with different
treatment and management of risk. Rather than implicitly coordinating with competitor insurers to increase profits, insurers would
have an incentive to find the most accurate cost projection to minimize the risk of being outpriced by competitors. This would yield a
more accurate price level and improve efficiency in the market.
The social costs of collusive price setting are significant. Collusion moves the equilibrium leftward along the demand curve,
reducing the total number of plans purchased and inflating prices.
This results in under-insurance in the market. Under-insurance
generates significant social costs because, as buyers are priced out
of the competitive market, the risks that they would have efficiently
managed, insured against, or both, go unmanaged and uninsured.
The costs of unmanaged risk will ultimately be transferred to other
entities in society in the form of higher taxes, higher insurance
prices, or both.
If insurers implicitly agree to set a supracompetitive price, they
price out potential clients who were willing to pay at or above the
competitive equilibrium but below the realized price. A deadweight
loss is thus created, reflecting the gains in trade that would have
129.

Kuzak & Larsen, supra note 66, at 97.
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been realized absent collusion. In addition, because a collusive market price shifts the market equilibrium price upward, a portion of
consumer surplus is removed and consumers' welfare is reduced
while producer surplus increases. Collusion and its harmful effects
are viable for insurers in the exempted market so long as some insurers do not "cheat" and lower their prices by using pre-Katrina
models. However, in an exempted market, it is cheaper for insurers
to take advantage of current models to set prices at a supracompetitive industry standard than to invest in more accurate cost
projections. As such, the only technologies likely to be developed
under exemption are profit-enhancing, not accuracy-improving,
ones.

2. Evidence Needed to Determine if Collusion is Taking Place
There is no clear reference point to which models' methods and
loss costs can be compared because actual hurricanes and costs are
in the future and are yet to be observed or measured. Because physically-based models are new and untested on a pattern of major
post-IKatrina hurricanes, there is little basis on which to prove price
coordination in the market.13 0
Over the next decade, experts could look to a number of indicators to determine whether model-based pricing is used to price
more accurately or instead simply to increase industry profits. This
will help determine whether weaknesses of current policy are manifested in actual supracompetitive pricing or in opportunities to do
so. Both, of course, carry social costs in differing amounts. 31
If modelers and insurers are pursuing accuracy, loss cost estimates will fluctuate with the anticipated damage from hurricanes,
increasing in certain periods to compensate for high-damage years
and decreasing in others to account for reduced cost in low-damage
years. This indicates pricing based on the risk of hurricane damage-a social benefit. If, on the other hand, modelers and insurers
are pursuing higher profits via collusion, loss cost estimates will
fluctuate with the number of insurers in the market, increasing in
years when the total number of insurers decreases and decreasing

130. See Grossi et al., supra note 89, at 34-35.
131. For example, the social cost of actual collusion in the market would be higher than
the potential for collusion, which would only include the risk premium of the market failure
occurring.
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in years when the total number of insurers increases. 3 2 This indicates pricing based on ability to collude-a social cost.
Data on cost estimates, anticipated damage, and number of insurers in the market under pre- and post-Katrina models may be
corroborated with evidence of increases in industry profits associated with post-Katrina modeling and pricing. 33 Given that the
justifications for models rest on generating rates closer to actual
cost, there should not be continuous growth in insurers' profits as
compared to the pre-Katrina model-based pricing system.

3. Benefits of Model-Based Pricing
A social benefit of the exempted market is that insurers are less
likely to underprice. The costs of the pre-1992 system are well documented. The availability of insurance was significantly reduced for
consumers in the wake of Hurricane Andrew as insurers reduced
the amount of property they insured along coastal regions.1 34 Today, insurers are not underpricing to the same degree they were in
the 1990s and have indeed increased prices with physically-based
models.13 5 However, with insufficient data, it is difficult to evaluate
the extent to which physically-based models improve accuracy.
The second benefit relates to mitigation and relocation. Higher
insurance rates encourage consumers to consider alternatives to insurance, such as retrofitting their homes to mitigate the risk of
hurricane damage. In hurricane-prone areas, consumers may have
an incentive to relocate to areas less susceptible to hurricanes
rather than purchase insurance. Relocation may not only maximize
expected utility for the consumer but also social welfare, while lowcost hurricane insurance may encourage policy-holders to ignore or
discount the riskiness of a location through moral hazard. Therefore, it may be more efficient for individuals to reside in less risky
areas than to insure against hurricanes whose probability of occurrence and anticipated damage are difficult to estimate. This effect,
however, depends on whether models' prices are in fact too "low"a fact far from certain and perhaps dubious under physically-based
models.
132. Because the transaction costs of collusion are greater as the number of firms increases, profits will be lower as the pool of insurers widens.
133. See, e.g., HUNTER, supra note 100, at 18-20 (Addenda A & B: Profits, Losses, Surplus
for All Property/Casualty Insurers and Top 10 Property/Casualty Insurers).
134. Grossi & Kunreuther, supra note 9, at 18.
135. See, e.g., Tran, supra note 84, at 92 (noting a 5.9 percent increase in 2006 for some
territories in the case of Massachusetts).
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4. Comparison of Costs and Benefits
There are distinct costs and benefits to maintaining MFA exemption in hurricane insurance. Although MFA allows for potential
coordination among insurers in setting prices via modeler intermediaries, exemption may also generate social savings due to less
underpricing, reduced insolvency risk, and improved incentives for
consumers to relocate and mitigate risk. Under traditional antitrust
analysis, behaviors that facilitate collusion among firms require a
36
substantial efficiency-enhancing benefit to persist in the market.'
Models' inherent methodological uncertainties, ability to generate
increasingly higher costs without evidence of correlation to anticipated damage, and proprietary and unregulated nature make them
suitable candidates for antitrust scrutiny.

D. How Would Model-Based Pricingbe Treated
Under Antitrust Law Absent MFA?
For MFA reform to remedy the competitive costs of hurricane
insurance pricing, there must be a viable antitrust case against
model-based pricing if exemption is removed. Under § 1 of the
Sherman Act, there are two avenues through which to challenge
this pricing practice: as an implicit agreement among insurers to fix
prices or as an anticompetitive information exchange under the
rule of reason. Both vehicles could be used by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) or Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to challenge
model-based pricing.
The first approach is based on the theory that insurers are horizontally colluding to inflate premium prices by collectively using
inflated cost calculations generated by modelers. The key element
necessary to prove this claim under the Sherman Act is an agreement among insurers to fix prices.13 7 The Supreme Court has held
that agreements can be either explicit or implicit-the latter of
which can be inferred through circumstantial evidence of a firm's
business behavior.1 38 An implicit agreement, however, must amount
to more than merely consciously parallel behavior and must contain factors "tending to exclude the possibility of independent
136. See, e.g., In reIns. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 345-48 (3d Cir. 2010).
137. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
138. Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954).
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action." 139 Such "plus factors" include: (1) interfirm communications, (2) actions against a firm's economic self-interest, (3) expert
testimony that price in the relevant market is higher than it would
be absent collusion, and (4) the presence of information
exchange. 40
In hurricane insurance, there is consciously parallel behavior
when all insurers flock to high-cost models to raise premiums. A
number of "plus factors" could also likely be identified. Comparing
pre- and post-Katrina premiums, profits, and losses could show
higher prices in the relevant market and actions taken against insurers' self-interest. Given that insurers were earning substantial
profits with the early models during Hurricane Katrina, collective
adoption of a new model with higher cost projections seems unlikely absent an agreement to collude. This is because individual
insurers could easily increase profits by charging pre-Katrina prices
in the inflated market. Insurer-insurer communication about prices
is also likely given the historical practice of sharing information
through rating bureaus and the implicit information that modelbased competitor prices reveal. Lastly, the exchange of cost information to modelers is itself a "facilitating practice that can help
support an inference of a price-fixing agreement."' 41
The second approach is based on the theory that insurers are
supplying a common agent-a single modeler or group of modelers-with collective information about costs in the industry that no
individual insurer would possess. This exchange of information itself enables the modeler, who interprets and aggregates the data, to
fix prices for the industry at a supracompetitive level and to generate cost estimates corresponding to those fixed prices.
The Supreme Court has held that information exchange can violate the Sherman Act despite the fact that "no specific agreement
[explicit or implicit] to restrict trade or fix prices is proved." 42
Such an exchange is nonetheless subjected to rule of reason analysis.

43

Under

the

rule

of reason, judges

balance

pro- and

139. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (citing Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)).
140. See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, Inc., 203 F.3d 1028,
1033 (8th Cir. 2000) (discussing interfirm communications, actions against economic selfinterest, and expert testimony on resulting higher prices); Todd v. Exxon, 275 F.3d 191, 198
(2d Cir. 2001) (discussing information exchange).
141. Todd, 275 F.3d at 198.
142. Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 410-11 (1921); see also
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978).
143. Todd, 275 F.3d at 198 ("There is a closely related but analytically distinct type of
claim ... where the violation lies in the information exchange itself ....This exchange of
information ...can be found unlawful under a rule of reason analysis.").
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anticompetitive effects in the market to determine whether a violation occurred. The Second Circuit has identified a number of "plus
factors" guiding this analysis that relate to the structure of the market and nature of the information exchanged. 44 These include: (1)
market concentration, 145 (2) fungibility of the product, 146 (3) inelasticity of demand, 47 (4) the time frame of data, (5) the
specificity of data, (6) public disclosure, and (7) the presence and
148
frequency of meetings between firms.
In hurricane insurance, a number of these "plus factors" could
likely be satisfied. For instance, the cost information given to modelers and the assumptions of the models themselves are not public
information. 149 Also, most of the information given to and used by
modelers relates to future costs and not present or past costs, making it more susceptible to anticompetitive uses.150 Data given to
modelers is specific enough to characterize the entire portfolio of
property covered by each insurer.'5 ' Experts have noted the increasing market concentration in hurricane insurance and the need to
purchase insurance despite price increases, suggesting that demand
is inelastic.' 52
Under either theory of antitrust liability, both the economic effects of model-based pricing in the market and the incentives these
models create for market participants are analyzed. Therefore, the
effect of MFA depends ultimately on whether model-based pricing
is, in itself, beneficial or harmful to the exempted market. If it is net
anticompetitive, then exemption insulates an activity that is restricting competition and reducing economic welfare-a social cost. If
the behavior is net procompetitive, then exemption protects a beneficial activity in the market and therefore improves efficiency-a
social benefit. If antitrust enforcement were implemented and regulators determined case-by-case whether particular instances of
model-based pricing were net anticompetitive, insurers would have
an incentive to hedge against the risks of litigation and their pricing
practices being held illegal. Consequently, they would conduct
144. Id. at 198, 208-14.
145. A highly concentrated market consists of fewer firms with larger shares of the
market.
146. Fungible goods are homogenous and interchangeable.
147. Inelastic demand is not highly sensitive to price changes.
148. See Todd, 275 F.3d at 208-14.
149. See Kuzak & Larsen, supra note 66, at 107.
150. See Grossi et al., supra note 89, at 26-27.
151. See id.
152. See HUNTER, supra note 100, at 10, 18 (Addendum A: Profits, Losses, Surplus for All
Property/Casualty Insurers; and Addendum B: Top 10 Property/Casualty Insurers). Cf Tran,
supra note 84, at 87-88.
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their own cost-benefit analysis based on existing enforcement and
legal developments and adapt their use of models accordingly.

III. A

PATH TO JUDICIAL REFORM: CREATING AN

EFFECTS

"REGULATED BY STATE LAW" WITHIN SECTION 2(B) OF

TEST FOR

MFA

There are multiple dimensions to ineffective rate regulation and
an overbroad interpretation of "regulated by State law" within MFA.
The path to determining their social costs (for example, under-insurance, higher premiums) is clear.15 3 The path to a remedy,
however, is not.
The primary decisions regarding the best structure of reform include whether competition and regulation are substitutes or
complements for one another and whether legislative or judicial
reform is preferable. The exact nature of reform and how it relates
to consumers, insurers, and regulators are also crucial to evaluating
its behavioral effects and likelihood of success. Ultimately, ajudicial
effects test reform to MFA is the most appropriate remedy.

A. Theoretical Considerations
Scholars debate the competing virtues of competition and regulation models for setting rates in various markets.1 54 According to
Professor Susan Beth Farmer, "[a]ntitrust and economic commentators have largely concluded that market competition tends to
produce better economic and social outcomes than regulation by
any level of government."' 55 Others argue that "[t]here is little reason to suppose that a state can do a better job than the market at
setting rates," citing market distortions, shortages, and higher administrative costs that accompany state regulation. 156 Supporting a
153.

These costs have also been observed in the property-casualty insurance market. See

Jay Angoff, InsuranceAgainst Competition:How the McCarran-FergusonAct Raises Prices and Profits
in the Property-CasualtyInsuranceIndustry, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 397, 402 (1988) (discussing price
inflation due to collusion in medical malpractice and general liability insurance).
154. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for RebalancingAntitrust and Regulation, 109
MICH. L. REv. 683, 729 (2011) ("As conditions in the market become more competitive, regulation may become inefficient ....
Antitrust enforcement might offer a less costly way to
meet those risks ....

'),

155. Farmer, supra note 8, at 925.
156. SeeJonathan R Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-FergusonAct of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 13, 84-85 (1993). Professor
Dempsey, on the other hand, associates nonprice costs with a failure to regulate. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failureand Regulatory Failureas Catalystsfor PoliticalChange: The Choice
Between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46 WAsH. & LEE L. Ray. 1, 31 (1989).
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market mechanism for setting prices, scholars assert that "[t] here is
no evidence .. that if suitable antitrust protections were in place,
15 7
the industry would not set rates at efficient levels.'
MFA drafters entrusted states with significant power to regulate
insurance rates in hopes that this would displace the need for antitrust enforcement against rate setting altogether.' 58 The drafters
seemed to view competition and regulation as mutually exclusive
entities, with the former generating disastrous consequences for insurers, consumers, and society. 159 The drafters' decision to
substitute regulation for competition and their vision of robust state
6
oversight of rates are supported in the Act's legislative history.'
Though the decision to displace competition with regulation
may be clear, the extent of regulation required to trigger antitrust
exemption is not.1 61 In numerous instances, legislators debating
MFA at the time of its passage delineated the extent to which insurance had to be "regulated by State law" in order to be exempt from
antitrust enforcement. 16 2 Subscribers of the "effective regulation"
view interpret these legislative exchanges to mean that MFA requires that state regulation be sufficiently adequate to trigger
antitrust exemption. 163 Regardless of whether one accepts this interpretation, it is clear that the drafters did not intend insurance rate
setting to exist in zones of "anti-competition" devoid of both mean64
ingful regulation and competition.
157. Macey & Miller, supra note 156, at 85. To the contrary, the authors cite evidence
from Illinois that auto and homeowners' insurance rates decreased with the introduction of
open market rate setting. Id,
158. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REc. 1481 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Ferguson) ("We believe
that... [state] legislatures... should exercise their judgment and regulate insurance.... .");
id. (remarks of Sen. Murdock) ("Congress would still retain the power ... by an act specifically relating to insurance, to invalidate an objectionable [state] regulation ....").
159. See, e.g., id. (remarks of Sen. Ferguson) ("[W]e cannot have open competition in
fixing rates on insurance. If we do, we shall have chaos. There will be failures, and failures
always follow losses.").
160. See supra notes 37-38; 91 CONG. REc. 1482 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Murdock)
("[Wihy not be willing to have confidence that the States will do a good job when they step
into [regulating insurance]?"). But see 91 CONG. REc. 1444 (1945) (remarks of Sen. White)
("[Federal antitrust laws] shall be applicable to whatever extent the State law fails to occupy
the ground and engage in regulation ... .
161. See supra Part I.B.
162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006); see also supra note 160; infta note 164.
163. See, e.g., Crawford v. Am. Title Ins. Co., 518 U.S. 217, 221-22 (5th Cir. 1975)
(Godbold,J., dissenting).
164. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REc. 1444 (1945) (remarks of Sen. White) ("If, however, the State
goes only to the point indicated, then these Federal statutes apply throughout the whole field
beyond the scope of the State's activity.") (emphasis added); id. (remarks of Sen. McCarran)
(agreeing with Sen. White's quoted remarks).
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MFA drafters envisioned rate regulation in the context of loss
experience-based pricing through rating bureaus 65 Under this vision, state-regulated bureaus and rate review laws would constrain
insurers' ability to price supracompetitively and prevent "naked
agreements fixing price or reducing coverage. '166 This constraint,
however, was removed with physically-based modeling, which divorces rates from loss experience and leaves insurance
commissioners without a transparent methodology with which to
67
assess the reasonableness of proposed rates.
Though MFA drafters viewed MFA and rate review laws as substitutes for each other, there is no reason they cannot function as
complements. 68 Most rate regulation merely sets price ceilings and
floors, below and above which price competition exists among insurers. 69 These ceilings and floors supplement antitrust
enforcement and are consistent with preventing anticompetitive
pricing and maximizing consumer welfare.1 70 Scholars have noted
that the two do not have conflicting purposes17 1 and that they
would enhance market efficiency operating in tandem.172 These
scholars argue that rate regulation eliminates a substantial transaction cost to consumers 73 and that both it and antitrust
enforcement "bring different but complementary skill sets to the
74
table."'
Antitrust law is process oriented. It focuses on preventing interferences with the competitive process. This, in turn, ensures that
the most accurate price signals of the value of insurance are transmitted in the market. Though antitrust experts may not know the
exact risks or extent of agreements to restrain trade, there is little
dispute that these agreements preclude efficient market outcomes
and are, as such, socially undesirable. Rate regulation, by contrast,
is outcome oriented and focuses on the technical precision of rate
165. See supra note 17.
166. IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 39, 219d, at 31.
167. See Mahdyiar & Porter, supra note 84, at 47, 66.
168. Darren Bush, Mission Creep: Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities as Applied to Deregulated Industries, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 761, 761 (2006) ("Traditionally, scholars, judges, and
practitioners have viewed antitrust and regulation as alternatives."). But seeAlt, supra note 38,
at 424.
169. See Klein, supra note 7, at 179.
170. See Bush, supra note 168, at 806 ("If the regulation promotes competition, the regulation is likely compatible with the antitrust laws."); Leibowitz, supra note 81, at 116.
171. See Bush, supranote 168, at 806 ("[T]he existence of a regulatory structure by itself
does not necessarily mean a conflict between state or federal legislation and the Sherman
Act.").
172. Id.
173. Leibowitz, supra note 81, at 116.
174. Bush, supra note 168, at 806.
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setting rather than incentives to price inaccurately (and anticompetitively). Having both tools available maximizes the chances of
discovering and preventing inaccurate pricing in insurance.

B. PracticalConsiderations
Assuming that the application of antitrust laws to insurance price
setting alongside rate regulation is socially beneficial, the question
of how to institute antitrust applicability remains. There are two basic options: seek legislative change through Congress or pursue
judicial reform through the courts. Because of the high costs and
low chances of success associated with a legislative strategy, judicial
reform is preferable.

1. A Legislative Approach
Although efforts at legislative reform could attract more attention than desired and mobilize industry opposition, a broad
coalition with significant resources might succeed. Advocates could
partner with state regulators, MFA critics, and professional groups
(for example, American Bar Association, American Academy of Actuaries) to lobby influential legislators to support a narrow repeal.
Since 1988, there have been numerous legislative attempts to repeal MFA in some form. 175 Recently, the Insurance Industry
Competition Act of 2009 was introduced in both houses and received bipartisan support from prominent legislators. 7 6 Strikingly,
neither it nor any other MFA reform has been passed by Congress.' 77 This is likely due to the significant influence of insurance
175.

These include: Fairness in Insurance Act of 1987, H.R. 2727, 100th Cong. (1987),

which replaced wholesale exemption with enumerated safe harbors; Insurance Competitive
Pricing Act of 1992, H.R. 9, 102d Cong. (1991), sponsored by Rep. Brooks, which prohibited

insurers from "price-fixing"; and Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2006,
S. 4025, 109th Cong. (2006), which would have incorporated the test for state action antitrust
immunity from Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) into section 2(b).
176. Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2007, S. 618, 110th Cong. (2007); HR. 1081,
110th Cong. (2007). This Act was introduced in the Senate and the House by Senator Leahy
and Representative DeFazio, respectively. The Act was reintroduced in 2009. H.R. 1583,
111th Cong. (2009).
177. SeeSagers, supra note 6, at 330, 333. See also id. at 325 ("This law... has more or less
always been controversial, and efforts to repeal it date back more than thirty years.").
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lobbies. 178 Removing MFA exemption will increase insurers' compliance costs, reduce profits, create uncertainty as to the legality of
established practices, and potentially compromise the effectiveness
of new modeling technology. As such, insurers will vigorously oppose any legislation that affects their price-setting exemption.

2. A Judicial Approach
Barriers to legislative modification suggest that ajudicial forum is
the more viable setting for MFA reform. M.F. Brinig has concluded,
based on empirical evidence, that interest groups attempting to reform MFA are most likely to seek judicial rather than legislative
relief. 179 In his words, "[b]ecause the challenge to the [insurance]
industry comes... from rather diffuse groups that might be dissuaded by the high costs of obtaining legislative relief," the most
likely avenues to reform "are coming in the federal courts."' 80
Judicial reform has a number of advantages. For one, it requires
less coalition building, lobbying, financing, and media attention
than a legislative strategy. Litigants would instead draw on existing
materials, history, and judicial opinions to advocate for a revised
reading of MFA's section 2(b). They could argue that overbroad
interpretation of "regulated by State law," combined with demonstrable changes in market conditions and antitrust analysis, justifies
a re-examination of the proviso. Litigants can craft arguments
based on scholarly commentary discussing the breadth and unintended consequences of existing judicial interpretations of section
2(b) of MFA and the inaccuracy of courts' interpretation of MFA
legislative history."" Minority views by district courts favoring an "effective regulation" interpretation of "regulated by State law" in
section 2(b) should also be consulted.1 2 Criticism from industry experts, consumer advocates, and regulators about the dangers
associated with antitrust exemption, inadequate state oversight of
rate setting, and model-based pricing would also be helpful. 8 3
178. M.F. Brinig, Politics, Economics and the McCarran-FergusonAct, 73 PUBL. CHOICE 371,
374 (1992) (noting that opposition stakeholders are "stymied at the .. . federal level by a
[then] $1.8 million dollar (reported) lobby").
179. Id. at 381.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Kintner et al., supra note 33, at 476; Weller, supra note 15; IA AREEDA &
HOVENKAmp, supra note 39, 1 219d, at 31.
182. See supra note 44.
183. See supra Part II.B.

1056

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL.
46:3
[

C. Proposalfor Reform
Based on the foregoing, the most desirable reform to the current
system would: (1) pursue change through the judicial system, given
the obstacles to legislative modification and the failure of past attempts, (2) leave intact both MFA and state rate regulation to serve
the dual and complementary aims of price competition and efficient rate setting, and (3) concentrate specifically on potentially
anticompetitive pricing behaviors in the market while leaving intact
those that enhance efficiency.
I propose that courts directly incorporate analysis of market conditions into the test for "regulated by State law" under MFA's
section 2(b). This would take the form of an effects test whereby
the determination of whether an activity is "regulated" by state law
is made through examining the activity's potential economic effect
in the relevant regulated market. Ultimately, the decision would
turn on whether or not the state is, in the words of MFA legislators,
"occupy[ing] the field" of regulating insurer price setting. 184
The effects test would not incorporate a full balancing of proand anticompetitive effects into section 2(b): that would obviate the
need for rule of reason analysis later on. Instead, the effects test
would place the burden on the party challenging MFA to produce
empirical evidence of potential anticompetitive effects of the pricing behavior in the relevant market under existing regulatory
constraints. Evidence of anticompetitive effects could include
econometric models and data, the opinions of actuarial and industry experts, and basic economic theory about market participant
behavior.
Judges would consider this evidence alongside countervailing arguments about the State's regulatory practice and its impact on the
market. This could include information about the rate review process, the basis for the State's decision to approve or disapprove
rates, and how nontraditional pricing mechanisms are treated
under the regulatory scheme. It could also include data on the economic effects that such action or inaction would have on pricing
behavior in the relevant market.
This new standard would equip judges with the tools needed to
exercise informed, case-by-case discretion as to whether specific activities are effectively "regulated" in the market or, at the other end
of the spectrum, if they exist in zones of "anti-competition." Because only practices with at least questionable social benefit are
likely to be challenged, this has the advantage of focusing scrutiny
184. 91

CONG.

REC. 1444 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Barkley).
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on pricing activities and types of insurance with the greatest potential social cost. For instance, given the highly unpredictable nature
of hurricane risks, enforcing antitrust laws against pricing in hurricane insurance makes more sense than doing so in life or
automobile sectors, where risks are more predictable. An effects test
allows for the flexibility to make these distinctions.
Creating an effects-based exception to MFA provides the best antidote to uncertain pricing decisions based on unpredictable risks,
such as damage caused by hurricanes. By equipping agencies and
courts with information about the antitrust consequences of various
prediction technologies and the robustness of underlying data,
such an exception provides an additional safeguard against inaccurate pricing and inefficient market decisions. An effects test also has
the benefit of keeping the basic structure of MFA intact.
When agency investigation proceeds to the question of whether
the Sherman Act was violated, the DOJ or FTC could review evidence of the plus factors discussed in Part II.D. They could also
review evidence on model prices, anticipated hurricane damage,
and the number of insurers in the market to adduce the relationship between loss cost and insurer pricing. Antitrust enforcers may
also consider any correspondence between insurers and modelers
that supports the hypothesis that insurers pressured modelers to
generate higher loss costs. Information on how the models worktheir assumptions, modules, inputs, and codes-would also be available to experts, who could evaluate methodological or scientific
flaws.

IV:

DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES TO

MFA REFORM AND

IMPLICATIONS AND CRITICISMS OF PROPOSED REFORM

A. Implications and Criticism of an Effects Test
This section discusses the implications of an effects test as well as
criticism of this approach. Specifically, it considers its overlap with
the standard for state action immunity under antitrust law outlined
5
in CaliforniaRetail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,'18
potential congressional and agency responses, and criticisms based
on litigation costs, the legislative intent behind MFA, and judicial
efficiency.
185.

445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
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1. Implications of an Effects Test
In Parkerv. Brown,186 the Supreme Court established the doctrine
of antitrust immunity for state actors according to criteria defined
in its Midcal Aluminum decision. In order to be immune from antitrust enforcement, Midcal requires that an activity be "actively
supervised" by the state and that such supervision be "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy."18 7 The Parker
doctrine exists as an additional means of avoiding federal antitrust
enforcement absent MFA exemption and, as a result, there will be
downstream implications if an effects test under section 2(b) is
adopted into MFA analysis. Depending on the activity and the market, insurers and regulators may seek immunity through the Parker
standard of "active[ ] supervis[ion] " ss to avoid application of the
proposed effects test. States may re-arrange their regulatory structures to fit the Parker test and avoid complications with MFA. If
Parkerprovides a more favorable test, the behavioral incentives created by a section 2(b) effects test on insurers and state legislators
could dampen the impact of reform altogether.
A shift to the Parkerdoctrine caused by imposing an effects test is
nonetheless an improvement to the status quo. Because Midcal Aluminum incorporates the "active supervision" and "clearly
articulated" prongs, 8 9 it is less likely to shield anticompetitive activities from antitrust laws than is the current application of MFA.
Thus, even if insurers attempt to invoke state action immunity, the
net result is nonetheless greater scrutiny of insurer price setting
than currently exists.
An effects test keeps both the Parkerdoctrine and MFA intact, as
each would independently be more rigorous than current section
2(b) interpretation. Additionally, downstream effects would occur
with virtually any reform to MFA except one that merges the test for
"regulated by State law" with Midcats "active supervision" test. No
matter which reform is adopted, the Parkerdoctrine will be available
as a substitute for MFA exemption so long as the legal standards for
the two immunities are not identical. Consolidating the standards
for the two, however, is undesirable for other reasons. It effectively
obviates the need for and purpose behind the MFA in the first
place. As a result, consolidation would eliminate an additional legal
186.
187.
188.
189.

317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
Id.
Id.
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avenue, the MFA statute, through which to encourage procompetitive pricing behaviors. Also, because "active supervision" focuses on
qualitative characteristics of state regulation rather than economic
costs of unregulated activities, the costliest activities may persist unregulated in the market if section 2(b)'s standard merged with
Parker requirements.
Other potential repercussions include congressional action to
overturn or minimize the effects of judicial reform. Congress could
revise MFA to indicate that it should apply whenever a state has
generally authorized insurance regulations. However, given Congress's recent interest in repealing components of MFA, this hardly
seems likely. 190 In fact, Congress might use the opportunity to
toughen the standard for antitrust exemption, include more term
definitions for "regulated" or "business of insurance," or explicitly
list exempted activities.
It is also possible that the DOJ or FTC will not elect to actively
challenge or prosecute cases where an MFA defense is raised if the
proposed reform is adopted. They could take the position that rate
setting is categorically exempt from antitrust enforcement, although this seems unlikely given recent statements concerning
price fixing and MFA repeal. 19 1 Adoption of this policy is still possible, however, given that enforcement priorities and strategies often
19 2
vary by Administration.

2. Criticism of Effects Test
Critics of this proposal will likely argue that implementation of
this new standard will be unduly costly to litigants and create unnecessary uncertainty in the already-complicated sphere of insurance
pricing. Professor Spillane notes that applying antitrust laws would
"drive [insurers] away from other matters of corporate policy-making . .. [and cause them to spend] millions in the aggregate on

190. See supra notes 175-76.
191. See ProhibitingPrice Fixing and Other Anticompetitive Conduct in the Health Insurance Industry: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 3-5 (2009) (statement of
Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice) ("[A]ntitrust
exemption is very expansive . . . . [It includes] 'the most egregiously anticompetitive
claims . . ,' ").
192. For instance, a 1990 GAO report describes increases in criminal enforcement from
the Carter to Reagan Administrations. See U.S. Gov'T Accourraiu.rv OFFIcE, GAO-91-2,
CHANGES IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POUCIES AND Ac'rvrEs 31 (1990).

1060

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 46:3

legal fees ... [,which] would be placed on the shoulders of in-

sureds through higher premiums." 9 3 This critique, however,
ignores the fact that the current standard has the potential to work
even greater economic hardship on market participants through
lax state regulation and broad antitrust exemption.
The social costs of insurer price coordination far exceed the cost
of litigation. A glance at the profit levels and concentration in hurricane insurance 94 indicates that an absolute bar on antitrust
enforcement would be very costly in the long term. Consumers
would ultimately shoulder this burden in higher premiums, underinsurance, and lost surplus. Courts can and should consider current
market conditions-of which MFA drafters were certainly mindful-to determine whether activities are "regulated" under MFA,
and thus exempt from antitrust enforcement. Devising loose standards based on perceptions about whether a state is actually
regulating' 95 is unlikely to achieve the outcome sought by MFA architects: healthy insurance markets where prices are set at
actuarially fair rates.196 If one looks at the current market, in concert with longitudinal data on the behavior of insurers using
models, the need to reconsider existing interpretation should be
clear.
Scholars may argue that focusing on market analysis rather than
state action or inaction circumvents the plain meaning of the word
"regulated." The validity of this claim, however, depends on
whether one subscribes to the "effective regulation" or "general authorization" interpretation of the term. One could argue that an
effects test analysis for "regulated by State law" is more closely aligned with legislators' intent, given their repeated concerns that
regulation be sufficient and adequate to prevent insolvency and

193. Andrew Spillane, Measuringthe McCarran-FergusonAct's Antitrust Immunity, MARQ.L.
SCH. BLOG (July 9, 2011), http://aw.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2011/07/09/measuringthe-mccarran-ferguson-acts-antitrust-immunity/#hide.
194. See HUNTER, supra note 100, at 18 (Addenda A & B: Profits, Losses, Surplus for All
Property/Casualty Insurers and Top 10 Property/Casualty Insurers); Tran, supra note 84, at
87-88.
195. IA AREEDA & HOVENRAMP, supra note 39,
219c, at 25 ("[Tlhe presence of even
minimal state regulation, even on an issue unrelated to the antitrust suit, is generally sufficient to preserve the immunity.").
196. 91 CONG. REC. 1481 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Ferguson) ("If the company is not
sound and solvent at the time the claim is made, there is no insurance at all. That is what we
have tried to avoid.").
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abuse. 97 That said, judges sympathetic to the "general authorization" view may still think that this analysis is unsupported by the
Act's language and legislative history. 198
Finally, it may seem premature from a judicial economy perspective to engage in economic analysis and balancing so early in the
litigation-well before any attempt is made to determine whether
there is an antitrust violation. However, it has been the general
trend to incorporate more economic data and analysis into antitrust investigation and litigation-particularly at the DOJ. 99 These
agencies also have significant economic and expert resources at
their disposal. As such, it is unlikely that the agencies challenging
an MFA defense would be unable or unwilling to provide the necessary information at either the investigatory or discovery phases of
litigation.

B. Alternatives to an Effects Test
Scholars have proposed numerous reforms to MFA. Professor
Areeda has proposed applying the "supersede" clause, currently interpreted to qualify only the portion of section 2(b) above the
proviso, 20 0 to MFA's antitrust exemption.20 1 Areeda asserts that this

interpretation "create[s] a greater immunity than Parker creates"
and "immunize [s] activities that are clearly 'authorized' by state law
even . . . [if] not actively supervised." 20 2 Areeda's proposed reform

does not displace MFA with state action doctrine but instead raises
the threshold for "regulated by State law" while keeping it below
Parker's requirements.
Depending on how liberally "impair" in section 2(b) is interpreted under Areeda's proposal, such an interpretation could
expose many anticompetitive activities to antitrust scrutiny. For
nonantitrust federal laws, MFA interpretation currently "consider[s] the extent of actual conflict between the federal action and
197. See, e.g., id. at 1444 (remarks of Sens. White & McCarran).
198. See, e.g., id. at 1487 (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney) (describing MFA as "an invitation
to the States to legislate in good faith" and "an invitation to the insurance industry to operate
in good faith in the halls of the various State legislatures").
199. Interview with Thomas Barnett, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 2005 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 12 ("[E]conomic analysis is such a fundamental part of
what we do that it's hard for me to think of a matter.. . where I have not actively consulted
with the economics group.").
200. For a discussion of the textual structure of section 2(b), see supratext accompanying
note 26.
201. IA AREEDA & HOvENYAmP, supra note 39, 219d, at 31.
202. Id.

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform

1062

[VOL, 46:3

the state regulatory scheme." 20 Courts have defined "impair" as
that which presents "a direct conflict between the federal and state
law or when application of the federal law would frustrate a de20 4
clared state policy."
In the sphere of rate regulation, there is no "direct conflict" between establishing rate floors and ceilings and proscribing collusion
facilitated by sharing rate information. State statutes, however,
might expressly define the goals of rate regulation to conflict with
antitrust laws. Individual courts could also determine that information sharing and statistical pooling are illegal under the Sherman
Act 205 and thus find a direct conflict. These problems animate the
underlying problem with Areeda's reform-that it uses congruency
between antitrust and state insurance laws as a proxy to reduce the
social costs of MFA instead of directly targeting those costs.
Rather than employing a case-by-case analysis of the particular
effects of a given activity, Areeda's proposal filters out some harmful behavior by exposing more activities, on average, to scrutiny.
The decision of whether to exempt a given practice is left to courts'
perception of the congruence between rate regulation and antitrust
laws. This has little bearing on the problems of anticompetitive
practices in the market and provides no guarantee of reducing
their impact. Also, unless section 2(b)'s proviso is simultaneously
eliminated, such a revision would not change the existing standard
for "regulated by State law," which permits exemption in cases of
minimal regulation.
Professor Weller has put forth a variation of Professor Areeda's
proposal that proceeds in two stages. The first stage is identical to
Areeda's: determining whether antitrust laws "impair, invalidate, or
supersede" state regulation.20 6 The second stage is "a discriminating
analysis of state regulatory authority" that includes discerning
whether the state has asserted jurisdiction over the specific activity in
questionY 7v This test narrows the scope of section 2(b)'s proviso so
that it reaches fewer activities. This is beneficial in cases where the
state fails to assert specific authority over the activity in question,
but would not include instances where the state purports to assert
203. Id.

219c, at 25.

204. Id.
205.

But see Mark F. Homing, Antitrust Immunity for the Insurance Industy: Repea4 Safe

Harbors, or Status Quo?, 8 AinTRusT 14, 15 (1994) ("Generally speaking ... the reporting of
price or cost information relating to past transactions is presumptively reasonable.").
206. For Weller's legislative history arguments for applicability of the proviso, see Weller,
supra note 15, at 603-06.
207.

Id. at 614.
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authority but fails to sufficiently regulate the activity. Thus, this reform proposal does not eliminate exemption for all anticompetitive
activities.
Legislators behind the Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement
Act of 2006 advanced this concept further, imputing to "regulated
by State law" a standard208 equivalent to the Midcal standard for
"regulated" under Parker immunity.20 9 Importing the Midcal standard, which requires a "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed

. . .

state policy" that is "actively supervised by the State,"

would reduce the scope of MFA exemption.2 10 It would not, however, directly target activities with the greatest risk of restricting
competition in the market (for example, collusive pricing), because
it focuses on state action rather than on predictable consequences
of state inaction.
Additionally, melding section 2 (b)'s "regulated by State law" with
the Parkerdoctrine would effectively obviate the existence and purpose of MFA. Professor Areeda discusses this result, noting that
"[i]f the insurance statute's regulation requirement were to coalesce with the Parkerrequirements, the scope of the [MFA] would
be largely irrelevant as a practical matter."2 11 Such a dramatic modification of insurance and antitrust doctrine is undesirable because
it eliminates an avenue through which to encourage procompetitive pricing among insurers.
Some scholars have argued for a wholesale repeal of MFA with
specifically delineated safe harbors of activity retaining exemption.2 12 These safe harbors would serve "to deter unwarranted
private litigation testing the limits of permissible insurer conduct
absent an exemption." 21 3 Typical swaths of conduct covered include
collecting and disseminating loss data, determining a loss development factor, sharing standardized forms, and participating in
2 14
voluntary joint underwriting agreements (JUAs).
Repeal, generally, is a disproportionate response to the challenges posed by price coordination. More tailored approaches that
208. Insurance Industry Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2006, S. 4025, 109th Cong. (2006).
209. See generally Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980).
210. See id. at 105.
211. IA AREEDA & HovFswn,, supra note 39, 219c, at 27.
212. See, e.g., Homing, supra note 205, at 15. But see Sagers, supra note 6, at 352 (arguing
against inclusion of safe harbors because of unintended consequences and "dampenfing]" of
beneficial effects).
213. SECnON OF ANTrrrusT LAw, AM. BAR Ass'N, CoMNsrs TO THE ANTrrTusT MODERNIZATION COMMISSION REGARDING THE McCARRAN-FERGUSON AcT 2 (2006).

214. Id. at 3. Many assert these activities would almost certainly be lawful under existing
antitrust law. See supra note 212.
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distinguish between the benefits and costs of exemption are better
positioned to correct the deficiencies of current law. Safe harbors,
on the other hand, create new categories and terms that must be
defined by courts. 21 5 The enumerated activities in the safe harbor

provisions are often widely understood to be legal under existing
antitrust laws absent exemption.2 1 6 There is little value in immunizing already-lawful behavior through creating new statutory
language to interpret. Furthermore, if ordinarily procompetitive activities are being used in certain cases to restrict competition,
categorical safe harbors may be too broad because they would ex2 17
empt both legal and illegal activity.

CONCLUSION

MFA and its role in modern insurance markets and antitrust law
are widely discussed among scholars and practitioners. Though
there is general consensus that the Act needs to be reformed, there
are differing views about how this should be done. By examining
the Act's costs and benefits in the context of model-based pricing in
hurricane insurance, this Note reveals what many already know to
be true: changing conditions in the market and legal system render
MFA's blanket exemption for price setting no longer justifiable.
Under this categorical interpretation of MFA, the statute has become a relic, too broad and inflexible to serve its original purpose.
The hope is that evidence from this case study will revive a tired
debate and renew examination of MFA's effects in insurance markets. Though there is no single pathway to reform, there should be
a growing realization in the legal community that MFA is in need of
serious legislative or judicial revision. This Note aims to assist in
framing the debate around its most glaring limitations in rapidly
evolving markets.

215. Cf Bush, supra note 168, at 783 ("[B]ecause of a lack of legislative history and clear
record as to the underlying purpose of the immunity, courts have often expanded the scope
of the immunity beyond its stated limit.").
216. See Sagers, supranote 6, at 347-48 ("[Information-sharing of [retrospective] variety
is very unlikely to be illegal even without antitrust immunity.").
217. See id. at 351.

